Procedural Posture

Procedural Posture

Defendant manufacturer appealed from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which denied the manufacturer’s motion to strike a complaint filed by plaintiffs, a consumer and her husband, under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16. The parties were represented by California business and employment attorney.

Overview

The consumer suffered a severe stroke after she had been consuming the product for approximately three years. The court held that, even construing the anti-SLAPP statute broadly, the manufacturer’s liability for plaintiffs’ injuries could not be characterized as being premised on speech or conduct by the manufacturer protected by the First Amendment. The First Amendment did not protect the manufacturer or seller of an unsafe product from liability for injuries caused by defects in that product. The implied warranty claims were based on the nature and effects of the product itself, not on injuries attributable to the marketing efforts by the manufacturer. Although plaintiffs’ claims for breach of express warranty and fraud did require proof of the manufacturer’s statements or representations concerning the product, the alleged wrongful, injury-producing conduct arose from the nature of the product itself, specifically whether the product was a drug, rather than a dietary supplement. Thus, the core of the wrongful injury-producing conduct alleged was not false advertising but that the manufacturer made and sold a defective product that caused the consumer’s physical injuries.

Outcome

The court affirmed the judgment.

Procedural Posture

Plaintiff borrowers appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which sustained defendant mortgage lender’s demurrer and dismissed the borrowers’ complaint for breach of contract, fraud, and statutory violations in connection with the lender’s foreclosure of a residential mortgage loan.

Overview

The complaint alleged breach of a forbearance agreement between the borrowers and the lender’s predecessor in interest. One of the borrowers filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition and listed the lender’s secured claim. In responding to an express question about counterclaims and setoffs on his personal property schedule, he did not list any claim against or any right to a setoff against the lender. The bankruptcy court confirmed a plan. The borrowers again defaulted on their mortgage payments, and the bankruptcy court terminated the automatic stay. The court held that the failure to disclose the existence of the claims against the lender in the bankruptcy proceedings barred the claims under the doctrines of equitable and judicial estoppel. Moreover, the borrowers failed to state claims for breach of contract and fraud because they did not allege performance, excuse for nonperformance, specific misrepresentations, or causation. The borrowers had no remedy for the lender’s alleged failure to contact them about options to avoid foreclosure under Civ. Code, §§ 2923.5, 2923.6, because postponement of foreclosure was the statutory remedy and the property already had been sold.

Outcome

The court affirmed the judgment.